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Comment
Lost Chance of Survival in Illinois: The Need
for Guidance from the Illinois
Supreme Court
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lost chance of survival actions involve factual situations in
which the conduct of a negligent tortfeasor causes a plaintiff to lose
some statistically viable potential for living.' A classic example of
a lost chance of survival case would be where a pedestrian is run
down by a car and then taken to a hospital where a doctor commits
malpractice. The pedestrian later dies. Assuming that upon arrival at the hospital, the pedestrian had at least a forty percent medical likelihood of survival if given proper medical care, and
assuming that his treating physician negligently failed to render the
necessary medical care, the Illinois appellate courts are split as to
whether such a plaintiff should recover for this statistical loss.
Some Illinois appellate decisions would deny recovery against the
doctor for the malpractice, because these cases require that the
plaintiff have a fifty-one percent chance of survival that is lost
before the plaintiff can recover.' However, two cases from the
First District Illinois Appellate Court would allow the plaintiff to
recover where the evidence shows, to a reasonable certainty, that a
delay in treatment or diagnosis lessened the effectiveness of treatment causing actual lost chance of survival.
1. Technically, when the lost opportunity for survival exceeds fifty percent, the situation does not actually constitute a lost chance of survival cause of action because traditional proximate cause standards have been met. For a general discussion of proximate
cause, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
263-80 (5th ed. 1984). Rather, lost opportunity for survival occurs when a plaintiff loses
a statistically significant opportunity to live which cannot be quantified at greater than
fifty percent.
2. See Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 4th
Div. 1989); Pumala v. Sipos, 517 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987); Russell by
Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (I11.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986); Curry v. Summer, 483
N.E.2d 711 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985). The language generally employed by these
courts is that the plaintiff must prove more probably than not that the malpractice was a
proximate cause of the injury. These courts have interpreted this language to require
proof of fifty-one percent causation.
3. See Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426 (Ill.
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The lost chance of survival situation frequently arises in medical
malpractice actions where a plaintiff with a preexisting condition,
such as cancer, alleges malpractice on the part of a doctor treating
that condition. The issue of whether to allow recovery in lost
chance of survival cases has been decided by the supreme courts of
many states, with a variety of outcomes.'
Currently, a split exists among the Illinois appellate court districts and even within the First District itself as to whether a plaintiff can recover in a lost chance of survival situation.5 The Illinois
Supreme Court has repeatedly denied leave to appeal with respect
to these conflicting appellate court holdings.6 The only Illinois

Supreme Court case that offers any guidance is Borowski v. Von
Solbrig,7 and this case does not directly address the lost chance of
survival issue. Borowski was decided in 1975 before the doctrine of
lost chance of survival began to be recognized by courts in the
United States. Thus, while the Borowski case involved a classic lost
chance of survival situation, the case was not argued or decided as
App. Ct. 1st Dist., 5th Div. 1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial
Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (I1. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 3d Div. 1986).
4. See infra note 13. For further information on the lost chance of survival recovery
issue, see Jim M. Perdue, Recovery for a Lost Chance of Survival: When the Doctor Gambles, Who Puts up the Stakes?, 28 S. TEX. L.J. 37 (1987); Allen E. Shoenberger, Medical
Malpractice Injury: Causation and Valuation of the Loss of a Chance to Survive, 6 J.
LEGAL MED. 51 (1985); Leon L. Wolfstone & Thomas J. Wolfstone, Recovery of Damagesfor the Loss of a Chance, 1982 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121 (1981); Patricia L. Andel,
Comment, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recover for the Loss of a Chance of Survival, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 973 (1985); Stephen F. Brennwald, Comment, Proving Causation
in "Loss ofA Chance" Cases: A ProportionalApproach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747 (1985);
David W. Counce, Recent Decisions, The Increased Risk Rule: Establishing "Probable"
Causation Through Mere Possibility, 27 ARiz. L. REV. 257 (1985); Howard Ross Feldman, Comment, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for the Loss of a Chance and
Increased Risk, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 139 (1987); Linda M. Roubik, Recent Developments, Recovery for "Loss of Chance" in a Wrongful Death Action, 59 WASH. L. REV. 981
(1984); Donna H. Smith, Note, IncreasedRisk ofHarm: A New Standardof Sufficiency of
Evidence of Causation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U. L. REV. 275 (1985).
5. See cases cited supra notes 2-3.
6. See Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1989), appeal denied, 553 N.E.2d 396 (Ill. 1990); Pumala v. Sipos, 517 N.E.2d 295 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987), appeal denied, 526 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. 1988); Chambers v. RushPresbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.), appeal
denied, 515 N.E.2d 102 (Ill. 1987); Russell by Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (11.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 736 (I11. 1987); Northern Trust Co. v.
Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986) (leave to
appeal denied by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1986 in an unreported opinion); Curry v.
Summer, 483 N.E.2d 711 (11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985) (leave to appeal denied bv the
Illinois Supreme Court in 1986 in an unreported opinion).
7. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301 (Ill. 1975).
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a lost chance case.' The Illinois appellate courts that have allowed
recovery, as well as those that have denied recovery for lost
chance, cite Borowski as support for their respective positions. 9
Indeed, if taken out of context, isolated propositions in Borowski
lend support for both sides of this issue. However, because the
Illinois Supreme Court decided Borowski at a time when lost
chance of survival was not widely recognized, and because the
court was not directly addressing a loss of chance argument, the
court was probably not concerned with the ramifications of its language with respect to lost chance cases. This Comment will examine specific language used in the Borowski decision which has
since been cited as authority by the Illinois appellate courts.1°
The absence of guidance by the Illinois Supreme Court has led
to lack of conformity in Illinois appellate court decisions. The issue of whether or not recovery should be allowed in loss of chance
cases has been litigated repeatedly in this state, as evidenced by the
growing number of appellate court decisions on the matter." In
addition, the highest courts of many other states have decided loss
of chance cases in the last ten years, giving clear guidance to their
lower courts as to whether or not recovery is allowed.' 2 Without
any such guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court, however, the
Illinois appellate courts have divided on both their holdings and
their rationales. Currently, whether or not a plaintiff can recover
for loss of chance in Illinois is determined only by which court
decides the case, rather than by any clear body of law. The Illinois
Supreme Court should grant leave to appeal in a loss of chance
case at the next available opportunity in order to set clear guidelines for the lower courts to follow.
This Comment will first discuss the historical development of
loss of chance doctrines. Next, it will review decisions of several
state supreme courts that have dealt with the loss of chance issue.
This Comment then will address the current conflict among the
Illinois appellate courts regarding recovery for lost chance of survival. Finally, this Comment will propose that decisions of other
state supreme courts provide methods by which the Illinois
Supreme Court could resolve this controversy.
8. Lost chance of survival cases are also referred to as lost chance cases and loss of
chance cases. This Comment uses these terms interchangeably.
9. See cases cited supra note 6. All of the cases listed in note 6 cite to Borowski.
10. See cases cited supra note 6.
11. See cases cited supra note 6.
12. See cases cited supra note 13.
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BACKGROUND

Over the last ten years, many state supreme courts have decided
cases involving lost chance of survival claims.13 These courts have
come up with three basically different approaches in terms of their
holdings. Two of these approaches allow recovery for lost chance
of survival, the difference between the two being the measure of
damages allowed. 4 The third group denies recovery in all lost
chance of survival situations. 15
One of the earliest and best known of the lost chance cases is
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperativeof Puget Sound.'6 Four differing opinions were set forth in Herskovits, 7 and these opinions
cover the majority of rationales the courts have since relied on in
deciding recovery for lost chance cases. The Herskovits case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit over a physician's failure to
timely diagnose lung cancer. 8 In order to allow recovery in a lost
chance of survival situation, the Herskovits court believed it needed
to look beyond traditional causation standards.' 9 The court noted
that in the typical tort case the "but for" test would be appropriate. 20 This test would involve proof that, "but for" the negligent
conduct of the defendant, the damages or death probably would
not have occurred.
The Herskovits court decided that a different proximate cause
standard should be used in loss of chance cases. The court relied
on Section 323 of the Second Restatement of Torts2' to establish
13. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. !984);
Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); DeBurkarte v.
Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986); Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp. Ctr., Inc.,
580 A.2d 206 (Md. 1990); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990);
Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d
398 (N.J. 1990); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983); Ehlinger by
Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990).
14. See cases cited supra note 13. All cases cited allow recovery except for Fennell
and Gooding.
15. See Fennell, 580 A.2d at 206; Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1015.
16. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
The Herskovits case is also included in WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 272 (8th ed. 1988).
17. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 474. In addition to the majority opinion, there was a
concurring opinion and were two dissenting opinions.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 476.
20. Id. at 477.
2!.
(
(r,)
u7 0oRTS § 321 (1965). Section 323 reads in pertinent
of;ur)
part:
One who undertakes ... to render services to another which he should recog-
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that negligently increasing another's risk of physical harm is sufficient to subject a defendant to liability.22 The Herskovits court
then decided that since the claim involved the increased risk of
harm to another, the issue of negligence could go to the jury on less
than the normal causation showing that would otherwise be
required.23
In reaching this conclusion, the Herskovits court was persuaded
by the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hamil v.
Bashline, a case that also relied on Section 323 of the Restatement. 24 The Herskovits court observed that under the Hamil decision, once a plaintiff has demonstrated that a defendant's acts or
omissions in a situation to which Section 323(a) applies have increased the risk of harm to another, such evidence allows the trier
of fact to find that such increased risk was in turn a substantial
factor in bringing about the resultant harm.2 ' The necessary proximate cause will be established if the jury finds such cause. 26 Accordingly, the Herskovits court determined that the Hamil
reasoning was sound and that on a showing of an increased risk of
harm, the question of negligence should go to the jury.27
Further, the majority opinion in Herskovits rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff must prove that the decedent
would have had a fifty-one percent chance of survival if the negligence had not occurred. 2 The court, however, did not allow recovery of full damages for the plaintiff's decedent's death and
instead determined that the measure of damages awarded should
be based only on damages caused directly by premature death,
such as lost earnings and additional medical expenses.29
The concurring opinion in Herskovits set forth an alternative approach to damages which would assess damages based on the percentage of reduction in chance of survival. 30 This concurring
opinion cited an influential article, written by Joseph H. King, Jr.,
nize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm ....
Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.; Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476.
Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479.
Id. at 477; see also Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978).
Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id. at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring).
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that appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 1981.31 The basic thesis
of that article is that the loss of chance should be treated as a separate injury.32 Professor King asserted that in basing recovery on a
fifty-one percent chance of survival standard and then allowing recovery of full damages, justice is not served. Nor is justice served,
Professor King argued, by allowing no recovery when the loss of
chance falls below fifty-one percent.33 Professor King's article
stated that the best approach is to limit the amount of damages
recoverable to the percentage of the loss of chance. 4
One of the dissenting opinions in Herskovits argued that the
plaintiff did not present evidence of proximate cause that rose
31. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
King was a Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of Law when the
article was published. This article has been cited repeatedly in other lost chance of survival cases. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 615 (Ariz.
1984); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Iowa 1986); Fennell v. Southern
Maryland Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 212 (Md. 1990); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp.,
462 N.W.2d 44, 50 (Mich. 1990); Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 591
(Nev. 1991); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 407 (N.J. 1990); McKellips v. Saint Francis
Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 476 (Okla. 1987); Ehlinger by Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d
754, 757-58 (Wis. 1990). The article is also cited in Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549
N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 4th Div. 1989).
32. King, supra note 31, at 1354.
33. Id. at 1378. Professor King stated that, "Destruction of a chance should also be
compensated for reasons of fairness. But for the defendant's tortious conduct, it would
not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of chance. Fate would have
run its course." Id.
34. Id. at 1382. Professor King gave the following rationale and example to illustrate
his proposed method for compensating plaintiffs for lost chance of survival:
A better method of valuation would measure a compensable chance as the
percentage probability by which the defendant's tortious conduct diminished
the likelihood of achieving some more favorable outcome. Under this approach, the trier of fact would continue to make the valuation, but would do so
within specific guidelines and parameters set by the court.
To illustrate, consider a patient who suffers a heart attack and dies as a result.
Assume that the defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the patient's
condition, but that the patient would have had only a 40% chance of survival
even with a timely diagnosis and proper care. Regardless of whether it could be
said that the defendant caused the decedent's death, he caused the loss of a
chance, and that chance-interest should be completely redressed in its own
right. Under the proposed rule, the plaintiff's compensation for the loss of the
victim's chance of surviving the heart attack would be 40% of the compensable
value of the victim's life had he survived (including what his earning capacity
would otherwise have been in the years following death). The value placed on
the patient's life would reflect such factors as his age, health, and earning potential, including the fact that he had suffered the heart attack and the :e,
'
iiiaL he had survived it. The 40% computation would be applied to that base
figure.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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above speculation and conjecture." The same dissenting opinion
also stated that relying on statistics to prove proximate cause could
lead to unjust results.36 The other dissenting opinion articulated
that there was authority for allowing recovery in a less than fiftyone percent loss
of chance case, but that justice was not persuaded
37
by this logic.

The Herskovits opinion represents an important step in allowing
recovery for lost chance of survival.3 s One of the most persuasive
arguments that the Herskovits majority opinion makes for allowing
recovery for lost chance of survival is that "[t]o decide otherwise
would be a blanket release from liability for doctors and hospitals
any time there was less than a 50 percent chance of survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence. ' 39 The Herskovits majority opinion seems to have decided that relaxing the traditional
causation standard was justified by both Section 323(a) of the Restatement and as a way of protecting the rights of those who may
have a less than fifty percent chance of survival.
In the years following the Herskovits decision, numerous other
state supreme courts heard cases involving lost chance of survival
claims.' For example, in 1987, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
issued an advisory opinion to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in McKellips v. Saint FrancisHospital,Inc.4 '

The Oklahoma Supreme Court in McKellips took a comprehensive
look at how other state courts had handled the lost chance of survival question. Ultimately, the McKellips court determined that
35. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 489 (Wash.
1983) (Brachtenbach, J.,dissenting).
36. Id. at 490 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 491 (Dolliver, J.,dissenting).
38. Because the various opinions in the Herskovits case scrutinized the topic in great
detail, many subsequent state supreme court opinions cited Herskovits as authority. See
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 614-15 (Ariz. 1984);
Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984); DeBurkarte
v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 136 (Iowa 1986); Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp. Ctr.,
Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 209 (Md. 1990); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 54
(Mich. 1990); Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 591 (Nev. 1991); Scafidi v.
Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 405 (N.J. 1990); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d
467, 472-73 (Okla. 1987); Ehlinger by Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Wis.
1990). In addition, the following Illinois appellate court cases also cite to Herskovits:
Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 4th Div.
1989); Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6, 11 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 3d Div. 1986); and Curry v. Summer, 483 N.E.2d 711, 719 (Il. App.
Ct. 4th Dist. 1985).
39. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 477.
40. See supra note 13 for a listing of those cases.
41. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987).
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recovery for lost chance of survival should be allowed and that the
damages should be limited to the percentage of the reduction in the
chance of survival.42
In discussing the various rationales for allowing recovery for loss
of chance, the McKellips court discussed the Fourth Circuit case of
Hicks v. United States.43 The Hicks decision did not specifically
address loss of chance, but its language concerning medical negligence standards has nonetheless been cited repeatedly in loss of
chance cases. 41 The following language of the Hicks decision has
been attributed with creating a "substantial possibility" standard
for the sufficiency of causation proof:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the
chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If
there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible to
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened
in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to
pass.45
In the Hicks case, the plaintiff's proof went beyond the substantial
possibility standard.4 6 Therefore, the "substantial possibility" lan42. Id. at 477. Specifically, the McKellips court stated:
In summary, we hold in medical malpractice cases involving the loss of a less
than even chance of recovery or survival where the plaintiff shows that the defendant's conduct caused a substantial reduction of the patient's chance of recovery or survival, irrespective of statistical evidence, the question of proximate
cause is for the jury. We further hold if a jury determines the defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the patient's injury, the defendant is liable for
only those damages proximately caused by his negligence which aggravated a
pre-existing condition. Consequently, a total recovery for all damages attributable to death are not allowed and damages should be limited in accordance
with the prescribed method of valuation.
Id.
43. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
44. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605, 614 (Ariz.
1984); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1019 (Fla. 1984);
DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 136 (Iowa 1986); Fennell v. Southern Maryland
Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 210-11 (Md. 1990); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462
N.W.2d 44, 50-51 (Mich. 1990); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 404 (N.J. 1990); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 472 (Okla. 1987); Hamil v. Bashline, 392
A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d
474, 477-78 (Wash. 1983); Ehlinger by Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Wis.
1990); see also Curry v. Summer, 483 N.E.2d 711, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985).
45. Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632.
4... ,,~'a 632 ("Bui.i, u" piaintiff:s experts testined categorically that if operated on
promptly, [the plaintiff's decedent] would have survived, and this is nowhere contradicted by the government expert.").
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guage in Hicks appears to be dictum. Nevertheless, some courts
have cited the above language as support that a substantial possibility of recovery is enough to meet causation standards.4"
The McKellips court's decision to allow recovery for lost chance
of survival appears to have been influenced by the same considerations that the Herskovits court mentioned. In particular, the McKellips court stated, "Health care providers should not be given the
benefit of the uncertainty created by their own negligent
conduct."4
The McKellips court adopted the substantial possibility standard
and gave an explanation of what the new standard on sufficiency of
proof actually meant.4 9 In effect, the decision lowered the plaintiff's burden of production to enable the plaintiff to more easily
establish a jury question on the issue of causation. The court noted
that lowering the standard gave the jury a greater role in the decision-making process and merely reallocated the power to decide
the issue of causation.50 The court, however, held that before a
plaintiff can recover, the jury still is required to determine that the
increase in risk under the circumstances was more likely than not a
substantial factor in causing the harm.5 ' Thus, a plaintiff is not
guaranteed recovery just because he is filing a claim in a state that
has adopted a lost chance of survival doctrine. The plaintiff still is
required to persuade the jury that the conduct of the defendant
caused the loss of chance. However, states that do allow recovery
for lost chance of survival do not require the plaintiff to show that,
absent the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff would have had a
fifty-one percent chance or better of recovery.
Of the courts that are consistent with the McKellips court in allowing recovery for lost chance of survival, most have limited the
measure of damages recoverable to the percentage in reduction of
the chance of survival.52 Not all courts, however, have followed
this decision. 3 For example, a 1990 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Ehlinger by Ehlingerv. Sipes, 4 determined that recovery for
lost chance of survival could include recovery of the full measure
47. See McKellips, 741 P.2d at 467 n. 17 (citing Brown v. Koulizakis, 331 S.E.2d 440
(Va. 1985)).
48. Id. at 474.
49. Id. at 475.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574
A.2d 398 (N.J. 1990).
53. See infra notes 54-60.
54. Ehlinger by Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

of damages for the injuries sustained if the plaintiff could prove
that the negligence of the defendant was a "substantial factor" in
producing the harm.55
The Ehlinger case involved a defendant doctor's failure to diagnose a multiple pregnancy and the resulting injury at premature
birth. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ehlinger determined that
in order to establish causation, it was not necessary that the plaintiff show that proper diagnosis and treatment would have been successful. 56 The court held that to satisfy the burden of production
on causation, the plaintiff need only show that the omitted treatment was intended to prevent the very type of harm which resulted, that the plaintiff would have submitted to the treatment,
and that it is more probable than not that the treatment could have
lessened or avoided the plaintiff's injury had it been rendered. 7
Once the plaintiff has come forth with this burden of production, it
becomes a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's
58
harm.
In discussing the proper measure of damages the plaintiff should
be allowed to recover, the Ehlinger court stated that once the defendant's negligence is found to have been a substantial factor in
causing the harm, the trier of fact may also consider evidence of
the likelihood of success of proper treatment in determining the
amount of damages to be awarded. 9 Thus, while the results may
be similar to those states that limit the recovery to the percentage
of reduction in chance of survival, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
does not mandate that only these limited damages may be
awarded.'
Recently, the Maryland Supreme Court also decided a lost
chance of survival case. Applying a strict proximate cause standard, the court in Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Center,
Inc. 6 1 decided that recovery for lost chance of survival should not
be allowed.62 The Fennell case involved a medical malpractice
claim concerning failure to properly treat bacterial meningitis.
The plaintiff's expert in the case testified that even if treated in
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 763.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763.

6n

J:

61.
62.

Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp. Ctr., 580 A.2d 206 (Md. 1990).
Id. at 215.
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accordance with the appropriate standard of care, the plaintiff's
decedent still would have had only a forty percent chance of survival. 63 The Fennell court held that in order to demonstrate proximate cause, the plaintiff must prove by the preponderance of the
evidence that it is more probable than not that the defendant's act
caused the injury. 64
One reason the Fennell court gave for its decision not to allow
recovery for loss of chance is that, if it did allow such recovery,
damages would be awarded for the "possibility" that the negligence was a cause of the death. 65 The Fennell court found that
Maryland law did not allow damages based on mere possibilities.66
A final reason the court gave for its decision was soaring medical
malpractice insurance costs. The Fennell court was not persuaded
that "the benefits of allowing loss of chance damages in a survival
action offset the detriments of a probable increase in67medical malpractice litigation and malpractice insurance costs."
A dissenting opinion was also filed in the Fennell case. 68 The
dissent rejected the contention by the majority that loss of chance
damages should not be recovered due to the lack of mathematical
precision. 69 The dissent argued that it is unfair to allow a person
with a fifty-one percent possibility of surviving to recover damages
while a plaintiff with only a fifty percent possibility of surviving is
precluded from recovering any damages. 70 The conflicting opinions filed in the Fennell case illustrate the tension in the various
positions taken by groups supporting and arguing against recovery
for loss of chance.
The Nevada Supreme Court addressed lost chance of survival in
its recent decision of Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Center.7 1 The Perez court held that loss of chance damages could be recovered, but
that damages should be discounted to the extent that a pre-existing
condition likely contributed to death or serious injury. 72 Influ63. id. at 208.
64. Id. at 211.
65. Id. at 213.
66. Id. The Fennell court also stated: "Recognizing loss of chance damages in survival actions would involve serious public policy concerns. We are not convinced that
such a change should be initiated by this Court." Id. at 214.
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id. at 216 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting). Judge Adkins stated: "Tort law is not about mathematical niceties; it has to do with fairness to fault-free victims who have suffered harm by
reason of the tortious acts or omissions of others." Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
71. Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Ctr., 805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991).
72. Id. at 592.
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enced by some of the earlier decisions discussed in this section,
including Herskovits, McKellips, and Professor King's article, the
Perez court held that in order to recover, the chance of survival
must have been substantial.73 As in Fennell, a forceful dissenting
opinion was filed in Perez.74 The dissent in Perez argued that by
allowing recovery for loss of chance, the court was opening the
floodgates of litigation.7 As with Fennell, the opinions filed in Perez illustrate the continuing tension between protecting plaintiffs'
rights and curtailing litigation costs. 76
III.

DISCUSSION

Against this backdrop of almost ten years of decisions by other
state supreme courts, the Illinois appellate courts are split on the
issue of whether to allow recovery in lost chance of survival
cases.7 7 With no clear guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court,
73. Id. How to define what constitutes the loss of a "substantial" chance has been
discussed by some courts. The Perez court decided to leave that decision to be made on a
case by case basis in the future as evidenced in the following passage:
In accord with other courts adopting this view, we need not now state exactly
how high the chances of survival must be in order to be "substantial." We will
address this in the future on a case by case basis. There are limits, however, and
we doubt that a ten percent chance of survival referred to in the example in the
dissenting opinion would be actionable. Survivors of a person who had a truly
negligible chance of survival should not be allowed to bring a case fully through
trial. Perhaps more importantly, in cases where the chances of survival were
modest, plaintiffs will have little monetary incentive to bring a case to trial because damages would be drastically reduced to account for the preexisting
condition.
Id.
The Michigan Supreme Court took a similar approach in Falcon v. Memorial Hosp.,
462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990). The Falcon court held: "We are persuaded that loss of a
37.5 percent of opportunity of living constitutes a loss of a substantial opportunity of
avoiding physical harm. We need not now decide what lesser percentage would constitute a substantial loss of opportunity." Id. at 56-57 (footnotes omitted).
74. Perez, 805 P.2d at 593 (Steffen, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 598 (Steffen, J., dissenting).
76. It should be noted that in addition to the reasons discussed above, the cases discussed in this section also relied on common law cases in their own jurisdictions. As such
case law is not especially relevant to the issue of deciding loss of chance doctrine in
Illinois, the arguments based on the prior case law of the state were not discussed. In
addition, other arguments in the cases focused on the requirements under that particular
state's wrongful death statute. Again, due to the differences in such statutes among the
states, these issues were not relevant to the Illinois situation.
77. For Illinois appellate cases that have allowed recovery, see Chambers v. RushPresbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 5th Div.
1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Il1. App.
CL. ist Dist., 3d iJiv. i9 b). For those Illinois appellate cases that have denied recovery,
see Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 4th Div.
1989); Pumala v. Sipos, 517 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987); Russell by Russell
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the appellate courts have taken differing approaches to the lost
chance of survival problem. The following passages 'explore key
Illinois decisions.
Two cases from the First District Illinois Appellate Court have
allowed recovery in lost chance of survival cases. 78 The Illinois
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in both of these cases.79
In the first of these cases, Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss
Memorial Hospital,"° it was alleged that there was negligent delay
in medical treatment for a newborn infant, despite obvious and
progressive signs of deterioration in the otherwise healthy baby.
The plaintiff's expert could not say whether or not the delay made
a difference."1 The plaintiff's expert did testify, however, that the
sooner the treatment was instituted, the better it would have been
for the child and the less likely it would have been that she would
have become as seriously asphyxiated. 82 The expert further testified that because of the delay, the baby suffered an increase in
83
morbidity.

The Northern Trust court held that " '[e]vidence which shows to
a reasonable certainty that negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment ...

lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to es-

tablish proximate cause.' "84 In so holding, the Northern Trust
court cited Section 323 of the Restatement as support, and noted
that several courts, including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Hamil v. Bashline, had applied Section 323 to medical malpractice
cases.85 The Northern Trust holding borrowed the following language from Hamil v. Bashline:
Once a plaintiff has introduced evidence that a defendant's negligent act or omission increased the risk of harm to a person in
plaintiff's position, and that the harm was in fact sustained, it
becomes a question of fact for the jury as to whether or not that
v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986); Curry v. Summer, 483 N.E.2d
711 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985).
78. Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist., 5th Div. 1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial
Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 3d Div. 1986).
79. See supra note 6.
80. Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist., 3d Div. 1986).
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 12 (quoting James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Cal.
1980)).
85. Id. at 11.
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increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the harm. 6
The Northern Trust court was thus applying the "substantial factor" test that other courts have applied. The Northern Trust case
was decided by the Third Division of the First District Illinois Appellate Court.
The other First District case allowing recovery for lost chance of
survival, Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center,s7 was decided by the Fifth Division of the First District.
The Chambers case involved uncontested medical negligence; the
defendant's failure to give insulin to the plaintiff resulted in the
plaintiff suffering brain damage and lapsing into a coma."" The defendant admitted his negligence, but denied that the plaintiff met
his burden of proof on proximate cause. 9 The plaintiff also had
pancreatic cancer which went untreated because of the coma and
there was evidence that the plaintiff had only a thirty-three percent
chance of surviving if he had received proper medical treatment
four months earlier. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had to
show that there was more than a fifty percent chance of survival at
the time of the negligent treatment in order to meet his burden of
proof on proximate cause. 9° The Chambers court discussed at
length why the defendant's argument was incorrect. The court
cited the Northern Trust holding and based its decision, in part, on
the reasoning discussed above in relation to that case. 91
The Chambers court also discussed the proximate cause jury instruction given by the lower court: "It need not be the only cause,
nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it concurs with some
other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it,
causes the injury." 92 The defendant objected to this instruction on
appeal. 93 The Chambers court, however, pointed out that the defendant's negligence and the cancer concurred to cause decedent's
death. 94 Thus, the court concluded that the long-form proximate
cause instruction was properly given. 95
In addition, the Chambers court did not believe that the Illinois
86. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978)).
87. Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist., 5th Div. 1987).
88. Id. at 428.
89. Id. at 429.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 430.
92. Id. at 431.
v..

Id. at 427.

94.
95.

Id. at 432.
Id.
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Wrongful Death Act imposed a limitation against loss of chance
actions. The court held that the Illinois Wrongful Death Act does
not limit actions to healthy persons or persons with a better than
fifty percent chance of survival.96
The Chambers court specifically chose not to classify its holding
as a lost chance of survival holding, but rather as an accepted application of proximate cause law. Further, the court in Chambers
distinguished two contrary Illinois Appellate Court cases that it
felt did not properly reflect the case law on proximate cause as
expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Borowski v. Von Solbrig.9 7 In Borowski, the supreme court stated that it need not be
shown that a better result would have occurred if proper treatment
had been given.9" This holding by the Illinois Supreme Court is of
some significance in the lost chance of survival issue. Thus, in the
Chambers case, recovery was allowed when the defendant's negligence, acting in concert with the plaintiff's pre-existing condition,
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's death. 99
The decision of the Chambers court is somewhat unique in that
while its holding was based in part on the more traditional rationale for allowing recovery in loss of chance cases, the court also
discussed the idea of concurrent causes. Applying the rationale of
concurrent causes to the loss of chance situation appears to be a
rather unusual approach when looking at the other cases referred
to in this Comment. However, the concurrent causes argument
set forth in Chambers does have firm grounding in accepted tort
law. lOO
A separate line of Illinois appellate court cases, including another case from the First District, rejected a right to recover for
lost chance of survival. '0 ' Two years after the Northern Trust decision, the Fourth Division of the First District Illinois Appellate
Court in Hare v. FosterG. McGaw Hospital102 held that the Illinois
Supreme Court in Borowski 10 3 had set the correct standard for es96. Id.
97. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301 (Ill. 1975).
98. Id. at 305.
99. Chambers, 508 N.E.2d at 432-33.
100. See, e.g., Ray v. Cock Robin, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 9, 12 (Ill. 1974).
101. See Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.,
4th Div. 1989); Pumala v. Sipos, 517 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987); Russell by
Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986); Curry v. Summer, 483
N.E.2d 711 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985).
102. Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 4th
Div. 1989).
103. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301 (Ill. 1975).
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tablishing proximate cause in a medical malpractice action. 1 4
Thus, following Borowski, the Hare court employed the "more
probable than not standard" to require the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant's negligence more likely than not was a proximate
cause of the resulting injury. 105
The Hare case arose from an appeal from a directed verdict for
the defendant. Much of the discussion in Illinois case law on loss
of chance revolves around the question of what proof is necessary
for the question of causation to go to the jury. However, in Hare,
the plaintiff's expert never testified that the defendant's negligence
was a cause of the decedent's death nor that the alleged malpractice contributed to the death.' 1 6 In addition, there was evidence
introduced by the defendant's expert that the decedent's condition
could not have been detected even if proper care had been rendered.0 7 Thus, under any court's interpretation of the Borowski
case, the plaintiff in Hare failed to meet his burden of proof on
causation.
However, the Hare decision went further than necessary to decide the case before it. For example, the Hare court discussed the
problems of applying the traditional proximate cause standard to a
loss of chance case and discussed Section 323 of the Restatement of
Torts and the Herskovits case. 0 8 The Hare decision mischaracterized the Herskovits holding by asserting that, in Herskovits, if the
jury made a finding that the increased risk was a substantial factor
in bringing about the resultant harm, the plaintiff would be entitled
to the full amount of damages for the death. °9 The Herskovits
decision, however, is actually well known as a case in which recovery for loss of chance was allowed, but damages were limited. 10
The Hare court did acknowledge the conflict in the Illinois appellate courts. I"' The Hare court determined that it must apply the
burden of proof standard of Borowski and that only the Illinois
Supreme Court had authority to alter its own standard. 1' 2 The
104. Hare, 549 N.E.2d at 781. Citing the Borowski standard, the Hare court noted
that: "The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that to prove causation in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish that it is more probably true than not true that
the negligence was a proximate cause of the injury." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 781-82.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 782-83.
109. See id. at 783.
i iG.

See supra notes i6-39 ana accompanying text.

111.
112.

Hare, 549 N.E.2d at 783.
Id.
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Hare court also asserted that to allow recovery for loss of chance,
13
Illinois would need to amend its Wrongful Death Statute.'
The Hare decision interpreted the language of "a proximate
cause" in Borowski as requiring a fifty-one percent or more
cause. 114 There is no indication, however, of such a meaning in the
Borowski decision. As noted earlier, the language in the Borowski
case is argued out of context by both sides on the loss of chance
issue. In the Hare case, there was no expert testimony to support
the plaintiff's position that the defendant's negligence caused a loss
of chance.' 5 Therefore, much of the Hare court's language is
dicta." 6 Thus, while under any Illinois lost chance decision, the
Hare plaintiff would not have been entitled to recover for lost
chance of survival, the Hare court nonetheless used this case as an
opportunity to set forth its own opinion on the loss of chance issue.
One of the earliest Illinois appellate court decisions on loss of
chance also denied recovery to the plaintiff. In Curry v. Summer,"7 the trial court refused to give a jury instruction based on
Section 323 of the Second Restatement of Torts. The jury instruction which the plaintiff submitted read as follows: "A person who
undertakes to render services to another is liable for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care, if that failure
increased the risk of harm. '""I In affirming the trial court's decision, the Curry court held that such an instruction would mislead
the jury because "resulting from" is not defined within the instruction, and the jury might find liability once they found that the defendants increased the risk of harm." 9 The Curry court
interpreted this instruction as merely creating a duty. The court
asserted that Section 323(a) still required application of the usual
120
standards of proximate cause and burden of proof.
113. Id. at 784.
114. Id. at 783.
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116. For example, the Hare court stated:
[A] patient whose doctor's malpractice deprived him of a 49% chance of surviving his illness would be denied recovery on the basis that it was more probable
than not that he died from the illness. On the other hand, a patient deprived by
malpractice of a 51% chance of survival would recover the full extent of damages for the death because it was more probable than not that the malpractice
caused the death.
Hare, 549 N.E.2d at 782.
117. Curry v. Summer, 483 N.E.2d 711 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985).
118. Id. at 717.
119. Id. at 718.
120. Id. at 717-18. The Curry court stated: "Section 323(a) does go on to provide
liability for physical harm resulting from a breach of the duty, but it does not define what
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The Curry court also discussed cases from other jurisdictions
such as Hamil and Herskovits. The Curry court mischaracterized
Herskovits by implying that Herskovits held that the plaintiff can
only recover when the jury finds that the plaintiff would more
likely than not have survived or recovered absent the defendant's
negligence.' 2 ' Actually, in Herskovits,122 the plaintiff had a thirtynine percent chance of surviving at the time of the alleged negligence, and the alleged negligence caused a fourteen percent reduction in the decedent's chances for survival." 3 The Curry court
concluded that without showing that the decedent had a better
than even chance of survival, i.e., greater than fifty percent, the
plaintiff could not recover. 2 The Curry court held that this was
consistent with both the traditional burden of proof on proximate
cause and with the Borowski 125 holding.
One year later, in Russell by Russell v. Subbiah, 26 the Third District of the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the
trial court to grant summary judgment in a loss of chance case. In
Russell, the plaintiff's expert testified that if the defendant had diagnosed a tumor earlier, the plaintiff would have had a fifty-fifty
chance of regaining full use of his leg in a brief recovery period
rather than a two year recovery period. 127 The Russell court concluded that because the doctor's affidavit estimated the plaintiff's
chance of a better recovery at fifty-fifty but for the negligence of
the defendant, "the probabilities are equal that the conduct of the
defendant had no effect on the plaintiff's condition, or that it proximately caused his injury."'' 28 The court held that this failed to
satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof on causation and warranted
29
the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
The dissenting opinion in Russell argued that proximate cause is
a jury question and that it was improper to dismiss the case on
summary judgment. 30 In fact, four years later, the Illinois
is meant by 'resulting from.' We believe section 323(a) contemplates the usual standards
of proximate cause and burden of proof be applied under it." Id.
121. Id. at 719.
122. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
123. Id. at 475.
124. Curry, 483 N.E.2d at 717.
125. Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 328 N.E.2d 301 (Ii. 1975).
126. Russell by Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986).
127. Id. at 141.
128. Id.
129. Id.
.3,;.iU aL i42-43 (barry, J., dissenting). Judge Barry stated, "I certainly do not
agree with the majority view that the determinative factor was the doctor's statement that
there was a '50/50' probability the delay in diagnosis prolonged the recovery period." Id.

1991]

Lost Chance of Survival in Illinois

Supreme Court in Gatlin v. Ruder 131 took the same position as the
dissenting opinion in Russell regarding the propriety of dismissing
an action on a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff had
brought forth some evidence as to causation. 132 Although the Gatlin case did not involve a loss of chance action, the trial court applied the proximate cause standard set forth in Russell. The Gatlin
court held that, "the Russell standard accurately reflects a plaintiff's burden of proof at trial, but incorrectly sets forth a party's
burden on a summary judgment motion."' 133 The Gatlin court held
that because proximate cause is an issue of material fact in a negligence suit, once evidence is presented by the plaintiff that the defendant may have proximately caused the injuries, summary
judgment is no longer appropriate. 134 Thus, if the Illinois appellate
courts apply the Gatlin standard to loss of chance actions, it is very
likely that fewer of these actions will be dismissed at the summary
judgment stage.
Another Illinois appellate case holding against recovery in a lost
chance of survival situation is Pumala v. Sipos.' 3 However, the
Pumala case did not specifically turn on lost chance of survival
doctrine. In Pumala, a verdict was directed for the defendant
when the trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to present
evidence on causation. 36 The court based its ruling on the fact
that the plaintiff's expert could neither testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty nor say that it was more probable than
not that the plaintiff's injury occurred as a result of the defendant's
negligence. 137 The court concluded that the testimony regarding
proximate cause was insufficient to present a question for the jury
138
to determine.
In sum, whether a loss of chance action is allowed may very well
depend on which appellate panel of justices reviews the case. Two
divisions of the First District Illinois Appellate Court have allowed
at 142 (Barry, J., dissenting). Judge Barry went on to conclude that "proximate cause is

a material question of fact which should be submitted to trial." Id. at 143 (Barry, J.,
dissenting).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Gatlin v. Ruder, 560 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. 1990).
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id.
Pumala v. Sipos, 517 N.E.2d 295 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987).
Id. at 296.
Id. at 298-99.

138. Id. at 299. The Pumala court stated that, "A mere possibility is not sufficient to
sustain the burden of proof of proximate cause. The causal connection must not be contingent, speculative or merely possible." Id.
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recovery in a loss of chance situation,139 while another division of
the same district has indicated that it would deny recovery," 4 and
the Second, Third, and Fourth Districts all appear to deny
recovery.' 4 1
IV. ANALYSIS
The Illinois appellate cases allowing recovery as well as those
denying recovery have all cited Borowski as support.'42 It appears
that the only way to resolve this conflict is for the Illinois Supreme
Court to clarify how the Borowski holding should apply in a loss of
chance situation. There is a lack of consistency in how the Illinois
appellate courts are applying the standards set forth by the Illinois
Supreme Court. By denying leave to appeal in these loss of chance
cases over the last six years,' 43 the Illinois Supreme Court has allowed the controversy to continue. In order to prevent unnecessary litigation and to insure that the laws of the State of Illinois are
applied uniformly, the Illinois Supreme Court should grant leave
to appeal in a lost chance of survival case and specifically decide
the issue.
As discussed in connection with other state supreme court decisions, there are several theories that the Illinois Supreme Court
could look to in determining whether or not to allow recovery for
lost chance of survival. The barrier that some Illinois appellate
courts have found to allowing recovery for loss of chance is that, to
do so, traditional proximate causation standards must be relaxed.
There are, however, two possible methods for allowing recovery
that do not require any relaxation of traditional proximate cause
standards.
The first method, which provides a novel approach to loss of
chance recovery, is to treat the negligence and the pre-existing condition as concurrent causes.'" Under this method, it is unnecessary that the alleged negligence be found to be the only cause in
order to establish proximate causation.
139. Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist., 5th Div. 1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial
Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 3d Div. 1986).
140. Hare v. Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 4th
Div. 1989).
141. Pumala v. Sipos, 517 N.E.2d 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987); Russell by Russell v. Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986); Curry v. Summer, 483
N.E.2d 711 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985).
i42. See supra notes 2-3.
143. See supra note 6.
144. See supra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
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The Illinois Supreme Court decision in Ray v. Cock Robin,
Inc. 45 supports the idea that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Relying on fundamental negligence doctrines, the Ray court held, " 'there may be more than one
proximate cause of injury, and ... one is liable for its negligent
conduct whether it contributed in whole or in part to the plaintiff's
injury, so long as it was one of the proximate causes of the injury.' "1 This holding lends support to the idea that, although the
negligence of a defendant is not the sole cause of the injury, the
defendant may nevertheless be held liable for the plaintiff's injury.
Concurrent causation appears to be one of the rationales the
Chambers court was advancing.1 47 Thus, under accepted tort law,
it is not required that the defendant's conduct be the sole cause of
the plaintiff's injury.141 If the defendant's negligence is viewed as a
concurrent cause with the plaintiff's pre-existing condition, proximate causation can be found without relaxing traditional
standards.
One potential difficulty with the concurrent causes theory is that
when the concurrent cause is a pre-existing condition of the plaintiff, the defendant could argue that under the Illinois law of contributory negligence, the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover
if the plaintiff's own negligence (the pre-existing condition in this
situation) is greater than fifty percent. In a loss of chance situation, the plaintiff will always have had a fifty percent or less chance
of survival or recovery at the time of the defendant's negligence. 49
145. Ray v. Cock Robin Inc., 310 N.E.2d 9 (Il. 1974).
146. Id. at 12 (quoting Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769, 780 (11.
1964)) (citations omitted).
147. Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 508 N.E.2d 426, 43032 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 5th Div. 1987). The Chambers court discussed why the longform jury instruction was appropriate in the lost chance of survival situation.
Defendants' alternative argument, that the long form proximate cause instruction given to the jury deprived them of a fair trial, is without merit. They object
to the inclusion of the following sentences in the instruction: "It need not be the
only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it concurs with some
other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the
injury."
Id. at 431 (citations omitted). The court went on to note that, "The comment to this
instruction notes that it is appropriate to use the two sentences quoted above where there
is evidence that something or the acts of a person other than the defendant proximately
caused the injury." Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that the "defendants'
defense theory that something other than their negligence (i.e., cancer) caused the death
makes the use of the long form instruction appropriate according to the accompanying
comment." Id. at 432.
148. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 265-68.
149. See supra note 1.
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Therefore, while the idea of treating the defendant's negligence as
one of several causes is theoretically possible, if the plaintiff's own
condition were to be treated as contributory negligence, then recovery could not be allowed under this theory. In practice, however, the plaintiff's pre-existing condition is not the result of his
own negligence in a lost chance case, so it is not analogous to a
contributory negligence situation. One advantage to this concurrent cause theory for the plaintiff is that the plaintiff should be able
to recover full damages if the defendant's conduct was a proximate
cause of the injury, even if the defendant's conduct was not the sole
proximate cause.
The second and more widely followed method for allowing recovery for loss of chance without relaxing traditional proximate
cause requirements is to treat the reduction in chance of survival or
recovery as the injury itself. 150 This approach would be consistent
with the holdings of the majority of state supreme courts that have
decided the issue. If the loss of opportunity to survive or recover is
a distinct injury, then proximate cause can be shown even if the
plaintiff has less than a fifty-one percent chance of recovery. The
difficulty with this approach is in determining how damages should
be measured for this injury of the loss of opportunity to survive or
recover. 151
When the loss of chance injury is treated as a distinct injury for
which the plaintiff is recovering, damages are sometimes measured
by a percentage of the total value of the plaintiff's life. The percentage is determined in relation to the reduction in chance of survival or recovery. 1 52 This method has been widely accepted, in
150. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
151. Beyond the issue of allowing loss of chance damages, a corollary issue involves
which damage elements should even be included in a loss of chance recovery. At the
outset, it should be noted that issues dealing with specific elements of damages recoverable in a lost chance of survival action, such as loss of consortium, are beyond the scope
of this article.
However, states have taken varying approaches to the problem of which specific damages should be allowed, and exactly which elements should be included in a loss of chance
recovery is the subject of much controversy. For a review of the measure and elements of
damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions based on loss of chance, see Martin J.
McMahon, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Measure and Elements of Damages in Actions Based on Loss of Chance, 81 A.L.R. 4th 485 (1990). See also supra notes 13-15 and
accompanying text (listing the various approaches states have taken in awarding loss of
chance damages).
152. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in McKellips cited the following example to illustrate how the damages recovery would be measured:
Tu iiiustrate me method in a case where the jury determines from the statistical findings combined with the specific facts relevant to the patient[,] the patient
originally had a 40% chance of cure and the physician's negligence reduced the
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large part due to the influence of Professor King's article,1 53 as this
was his suggestion as to how to compensate plaintiffs for loss of
chance.
A somewhat different approach was taken by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Ehlinger by Ehlinger v. Sipes. 5 4 It appears that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court advocates a method whereby all of
the relevant information is given to the jury, including evidence of
the likelihood of success of proper treatment, and then the jury
determines what a just amount of damages is if the negligence is a
substantial factor in causing the harm.15 5 This approach gives juries more leeway than applying a straight percentage result. One
advantage to this method is that while statistics on rates of survival
obtained through expert testimony are likely to vary considerably,
the figure that a jury of twelve arrives at will be the result of a more
complex valuation process. Thus, while the statistical approach
has the advantage of ease of application, the Ehlinger court's approach may lead to more just results because the jury has the opportunity to assess and evaluate all factors.
Even without relaxing traditional causation standards, Illinois
could allow recovery for loss of chance under either of the two
methods outlined above. However, a question arises as to whether
or not such recovery should be allowed at all without showing
fifty-one percent causation of the total injury. The loss of chance
situation is not the only area where recovery is sought without the
requirement of proving fifty-one percent causation of the total
injury.

156

1 57
A recent set of Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinions
held that a coal miner must only show that his black lung disease is
a contributing cause of his disability to recover under the Black
Lung Act. In each case, however, Judge Coffey strongly disagreed
with the above analysis, arguing that in order to recover, a coal

chance of cure to 25%, (40% - 25%) 15% represents the patient's loss of survival. If the total amount of damages proved by the evidence is $500,000, the
damages caused by the defendant is 15% x $500,000 or $75,000.
McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 477 (Okla. 1987).
153. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
154. Ehlinger by Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990). The Ehlinger court
did not treat the loss of chance as a distinct injury, but rather allowed the jury to find
causation of the whole injury when the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in
producing the harm.
155. See id. at 763.
156. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
157. Collins v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, United States Dep't of
Labor, 932 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1991); Compton v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 933 F.2d 477
(7th Cir. 1991); Shelton v. Old Ben Coal Co., 933 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1991).
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miner should have to prove that black lung disease caused at least
fifty-one percent of his disability.15 8 Judge Coffey further argued
that using a lower standard allows miners whose disabilities were
caused primarily by smoking or congenital heart disease to qualify
for government benefits.1 59 The majority, however, held against
this view. Thus, in areas other than loss of chance, courts have
realized.that :it
is not always possibleto show fifty-one percent causation in a case where recovery should still be allowed.
Further support for allowing recovery in the loss of chance situation appears in the majority of other state supreme court cases.
As discussed above, many of these courts have noted thato deny
recovery would mean that a person with less than a fifty percent
chance of survival who enters a hospital would have no redress, no
matter how gross the negligence of the defendant.1 10 Although
such. a person may have a fifty percent or less chance of surviving
his injury or illness, whatever chances that person possesses are
one hundred percent of his future. To deny any recovery to a person who loses a substantial chance of surviving would be to essentially say that once your chances reach fifty percent or less, your
life is worthless.
In answer to the contention that allowing recovery for loss of
chance will open the "floodgates of litigation," it should be noted
that the economic realities of attempting to recover in such a lawsuit, especially in the medical malpractice context, will very likely
insure that cases are only brought where the damages are substantial and the negligence is fairly clear. Because tort cases are almost
always handled on a contingency fee basis, it is highly unlikely that
cases will be filed where the loss of chance is a very small percentage. In addition, by including language limiting recovery to cases
where the loss of chance is "substantial," the Illinois Supreme
Court would limit successful plaintiffs' actions to truly meritorious
cases.
Depending on the approach taken by the Illinois Supreme
Court, allowing recovery for loss of chance is consistent with prior
case law in Illinois on causation. The Illinois Supreme Court
should decide a loss of chance case and set forth guidelines to be
158. Collins, 932 F.2d at 1195 (Coffey, J., concurring); Compton, 933 F.2d at 492
(Coffey, J., concurring); Shelton, 933 F.2d at 509 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
159. Collins, 932 F.2d at 1195 (Coffey, J., concurring') Cnmn-n
011 V.21 at 432
(Cs..zy, J.,

nuwurring); Sheiton, 933 F.2d at 509 (Coffey, J., dissenting).

160. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477
(Wash. 1983).
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followed by both the Illinois trial courts and the Illinois appellate
courts.
V.

PROPOSAL

The Illinois Supreme Court should allow recovery for loss of
chance damages when the loss of chance is'substantial. By allowing the jury to decide when proximate causation has been
proved and what the proper measure of damages is based on all of
the evidence, the Illinois Supreme Court can insure that the people
of Illinois are themselves determining what is just compensation
and which claims are meritorious. To deny recovery anytime a
plaintiff has a fifty percent or less chance of recovery would be
dangerous to the public at large and unfair to the individual plaintiff.16 1 Violations of the standard of care do not always mean that

the negligence has caused the plaintiff to lose a significant chance
of survival. However, when the plaintiff can prove that due to the
negligence of a defendant, the plaintiff was deprived of a substantial opportunity to survive or recover, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover damages.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Illinois appellate court decisions on loss of
chance has been noted in an American Law Reports annotation. 162
This confusion has led the highest courts of other states to cite
Illinois as both a state that allows recovery and as one that does
not allow recovery, depending upon which side of the issue the
court is seeking to support. 163 The trial courts in Illinois are left
161. The McKellips court gave the following rationale for allowing recovery:
Health care providers should not be given the benefit of the uncertainty created
by their own negligent conduct. To hold' otherwise would be in effect to allow
care providers to evade liability for their negligent actions or inactions in situations in which patients would not necessarily have survived or recovered, but
still would have a significant chance of survival or recovery.
McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 474 (Okla. 1987).
162. John D. Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality,
54 A.L.R. 4th 10 (1990). Illinois is listed in a section on jurisdictions in which requirements are not settled. The annotation cites Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 3d Div. 1986), Russell by Russell v.
Subbiah, 500 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986) and Curry v. Summer, 483 N.E.2d
711 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985), to show the conflict in Illinois.
163. For example, the dissenting opinion in Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d
44, 62 (Mich. 1990) (Riley, C.J., dissenting), cites Curry, as support for the idea that
§ 323 of the Restatement simply establishes a duty, while the majority opinion in Scafidi
v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 404 (N.J. 1990), cites to Chambers and Northern Trust as authority for allowing recovery in lost chance of survival situations.
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without guidance as to what to do in a loss of chance case. In the
First District, a trial court would be further confused by looking at
the split in its own appellate district.
The Illinois Supreme Court should resolve this conflict by deciding a loss of chance case and setting forth clear guidelines as to
when and how recovery should be allowed. This author believes
that the fairest and safest result is to allow recovery in loss of
chance cases where the loss of opportunity is substantial. However, regardless of how the Illinois Supreme Court decides the issue, it is time to give guidance to both the lower courts and future
litigants.
SHELLY
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